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ately begins with the financial legislation of the four successive years, describing the various ways of supplying the sinews of war. These consisted mainly of placing loans and issuing paper money. The output of notes steadily gained on the sale of bonds, the fifteen million loan of 1861 being tardily supplemented by the one hundred million loan of 1862, while the Treasury currency quickened its rate of emission from three to fifty million dollars a month, and the money-printing machine became the unfailing asset of the administration. The non-effectiveness of the produce loan with its badly ordered subscription of crops is carefully traced and all the manipulations of the foreign loan of 75,000,000 francs effected by Emile Erlanger are clearly unfolded. The comments of Professor Schwab on the financial policy are pertinent and the analogies to other money experiments are exceedingly instructive. His criticisms are not too severe of the false reasoning, of vagueness of official estimates and of the blind reliance on the efficacy of the funding scheme to relieve all redundancy of note issues. The chapters on "Legal Tender" and on "Prices" are models of economic presentation, yet the insertion of the discussion of military despotism is of questionable utility. Taxation has not been treated in direct connection with the main fiscal matters and more attention is given to the illusory levy of 1861 than to the large measures of 1863-1864. The rebates of tax in kind against property tax and of property tax against income and the unfair valuations are not sufficiently stressed. The persistence of the agricultural class in Congress in retaining these exemptions led mainly to the resignation of Secretary Memminger; and his successor, Trenholm, came urging the same programme of unimpaired taxation, then overwhelmingly too late. The author would have added to the completeness of his admirable study had he more at length, in a final view, set forth the negation of the various economic forces during the period of Southern history.

ERNEST ASHTON SMITH.

General McClellan. By General PETER S. MICHIE. [The Great Commanders Series.] (New York: D. Appleton and Co. 1901. Pp. ix, 489.)

No student of Civil War history can keep abreast of its unfoldings without reading Michie's *McClellan*.

By notable service in the eastern armies; by close study of military affairs; as the head of the West Point faculty; by his ability as a scholar; by his judicial temperament and power of analysis; he was well fitted to deal ably and impartially with the perplexing problems of McClellan's career. His is a condensed volume, the work of years, and the limits of this review can scarcely exceed the scope of a table of contents.

No preceding history has so clearly shown the thorough preparation which McClellan's training gave for the work which confronted him. Ten days after the firing on Fort Sumter the state of Ohio had commissioned him a Major General commanding her militia. Without waiting to visit his office, or his home, he took up his duties, and his marvellous

organizing powers at once appeared. He entered West Virginia with an admirable plan of campaign, but here on the threshold of his career was developed that caution, born of excessive overestimate of the enemy's strength which followed him to the end of his military life. Though Rosecrans and Blenker did the only fighting, the successes were naturally attributed to McClellan, and, before he had been tested as a commander in battle, he was ordered to Washington where the triumphs of West Virginia shone brightly against the gloom of Bull Run. A great army grew up as if by magic under his energy, skill and power, and he soon won universal confidence, admiration and applause. He at once became prolific with plans of wide scope including the whole country, but not providing for early movement on his own part. His differences with General Scott are vividly set forth.

New interest is given by the chapters which depict Mr. Lincoln's long-suffering, notwithstanding the rapid growth of that general dissatisfaction and impatience which soon followed McClellan's elevation to supreme command. During this rising storm the imperturbable commander took neither the President nor Cabinet into his confidence. Under the erroneous information of his Pinkerton service he pictured the enemy at thrice his real strength, and based his own inaction upon these excessive estimates.

The mortification of Johnston's unobserved and unmolested withdrawal, was followed by strenuous opposition to Mr. Lincoln's plan for an overland advance on Richmond, and insistence upon the peninsula route. He was allowed his way, but it immediately appeared that the transfer of his army had been made with a surprising lack of military foresight. The navy, upon which, without definite arrangement, he had largely counted, was watching the Merrimac, and not available. His information concerning the topography of the country in which he was to operate was defective. The difficulties of the whole campaign, the causes of its failure at every step of the advance, and its humiliating results have not heretofore been set forth so clearly by any writer, while at the same time full weight is given to all McClellan's reasons for his want of success.

The treatment of the bitter discussions over his connection with Pope's campaign must prove a great satisfaction to McClellan's friends, as well as to those of General Fitz John Porter who is held up both as a brilliant soldier, and a sterling patriot.

The gloom over Washington as the defeated army of Pope fell back into its defenses; the turning to McClellan as an organizer; the dilatory advance towards Antietam; the failure to strike promptly when captured orders showed the widely scattered condition of Lee's forces; the grave mismanagement of an army double that of Lee's in this the only great battle in which McClellan was personally upon the field, and the bloodiest one day's fight of the war; the hesitancy in following the escaping enemy; and his removal from command are the dark colors with which the author paints the closing scenes of McClellan's military career.

As a man, a military scholar, a loyal citizen, a patriotic general and

a gentleman, McClellan was General Michie's ideal. But notwithstanding his unquestioned and versatile abilities, the volume writes him down as a failure in the effective management of a great army in the face of the enemy.

H. V. BOYNTON.

Reconstruction in Mississippi. By JAMES WILFORD GARNER. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1901. Pp. xiii, 422).

The Reconstruction of Georgia. By EDWIN C. WOOLLEY, Ph.D. [Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law.] (New York: The Columbia University Press; The Macmillan Co. 1901. Pp. 112).

MR. WOOLLEY, so I understand, is a Northern man, Mr. Garner a Southerner. So much might perhaps be inferred from a comparison of their treatises, but to make the inference one must begin by conceding to both writers the purpose to be fair. Mr. Woolley avoids the risk of being unfair by declining to attempt any close study of Southern conditions and Southern character, but criticises freely the motives of the Northern leaders in Reconstruction and the policy they adopted. Mr. Garner is extremely shy of criticising the acts of Congress, and does not generalize about the policy, but his perfect familiarity with the people and the conditions in Mississippi is manifest. Each shows by his restraints his fear of being partial. So far as impartiality is honesty, neither leaves anything to be desired.

The merit of Mr. Woolley's essay is in making clear the legal and constitutional uncertainties, the two-sided questions, which successively arose to justify in some measure the curiously illogical steps by which Georgia was brought haltingly back into the Union—from which, according to the only constitutional theory which is consistent with the measures that had been taken to preserve it, she never had actually withdrawn herself at all. The author starts with the proposition that congressional Reconstruction was constitutional if we consider it an exercise of the war powers of Congress. After that, nothing is left to do but to interpret the Reconstruction Acts and reconcile them among themselves. He is logical in his contention that the question whether the ratification of the fifteenth amendment by Georgia validated the amendment itself has nothing to do with the right of Congress to require ratification, or anything else it chose, of the Georgia legislature. Without accepting the argument from war powers, one may concede that it is the best defense of the Reconstruction Acts against the charge of unconstitutionality.

On other grounds, Mr. Woolley criticises the whole plan unsparingly. Neither the humanitarian, the disciplinary, nor the political objects of it—so he classifies the motives of its promoters—were attained. As to the process in Georgia, he outlines it very barely, and concludes that the Reconstruction government of that particular state, though guilty of extravagance, of mismanaging the state railroad, and of pardoning too many criminals, was guiltless of the enormities it has been charged with